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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A review of the literature on neuroimaging, predictably, reveals a 
broad array of positions, promises and prophecies.  Carter Snead argues 
that the ambition of cognitive neuroscientists is “to use the claims of 
their discipline and the new powers conferred by neuroimaging to 
overthrow retributive justice as a legitimate justification for criminal 
sanctions.”1  Jonathan Marks quotes William Uttal’s warning that 
neuroimaging may be simply a “neo-phrenological fad.”2  David 
Eagleman claims, “There is a new potential to use detailed combinations 
of behavioral tests and neuroimaging to better predict recidivism.”3  
Perhaps most emphatically, Bruce Arrigo levels this critique: 
In short, the mass marketing and wholesale circulation of fMRI 
technology for medicolegal purposes endorses capitalist status quo 
dynamics and, as such, breeds, nurtures, and sustains the very 
structural inequalities (both social and psychological) that result in 
destructiveness, violence and crime.  Indeed, through reliance on such 
cognitive neuroscience advances, it is assumed that the path to 
“correcting” the ills of the individual are discoverable through reliance 
on the novel (though simulated or computer-generated) breakthroughs 
of science.4 
In this paper, I do not take sides on this debate.  Rather, I discuss a 
related, but distinctly separate issue: which of these positions will jurors 
think is right, especially in the context of deciding insanity defense 
cases.  The primary and robust debate that has taken place so far over 
neuroimaging in law and medical journals has highlighted a series of 
law-and-policy questions dealing primarily with reliability,5 
admissibility,6 and availability.7  Scholars have already expressed an 
 
 1. O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ‘Complexity’ of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1265, 1316 (2007). 
 2. Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-Brainer” 
or Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 492 n.64 (2007) (quoting WILLIAM UTTAL, 
THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN (2003)). 
 3. David Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 45 HOUS. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 36, 38. 
 4. Bruce Arrigo, Punishment, Freedom, and the Culture of Control: The Case of Brain 
Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 457, 480 (2007). 
 5. E.g., Richard Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal 
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U L. REV. 51, 75-77 (2006). 
 6. Avram Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital 
Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 521-22 (2007). 
 7. Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by 
Genetics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 5, 7. 
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extensive range of opinions on the value, and perhaps even the ethics, of 
this testimony.  Here, I shift the focus of this paper. 
I have spent many years thinking about and writing about the 
insanity defense and have basically concluded that the debate over the 
language of the tests employed, the moral philosophical dilemmas 
inherent in our discussions about free will and rational agentry, and the 
entire range of “what if” hypotheticals that make teaching the insanity 
defense a criminal law professor’s dream are all irrelevant to the core 
issues of attitudes: why do we (society) feel the way we do about the 
insanity defense, about insanity defense pleaders, and the disposition of 
insanity defense cases; and why do these feelings overwhelm any new 
scientific or behavioral evidence that develops around the question of 
why some individuals commit inexplicable criminal acts?8 
Thus, when we consider the topic that I will be addressing in this 
paper – the impact of neuroimaging evidence on juror decision making 
in insanity defense cases – we need to recalibrate our focus so as to 
incorporate other questions that are as essential (most likely more 
essential) to the resolution of the underlying dilemma: (1) to what extent 
will such evidence – apparently less inherently susceptible to 
falsification – have on jurors whose profound suspicion of mental state 
opinion testimony is well-documented;9 (2) will this “falsifiability issue” 
even matter to jurors whose personal values/moral codes reject the 
notion of any non-responsibility verdict because it is dissonant with their 
heuristics-driven, false “ordinary common sense”;10 (3) will there now 
be some shred of truth in one of the standard insanity defense myths 
 
 8. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
(1994) [hereinafter PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE]; Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little 
Girl”: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense”, 10 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Neonaticide]; Michael L. Perlin, “Big 
Ideas, Images and Distorted Facts”: The Insanity Defense, Genetics, and the “Political World”, in 
GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 37 
(Jeffrey Botkin et al. eds., 1999); Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from 
Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of 
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Borderline]; Michael L. Perlin, 
Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Political World]; Michael L. Perlin, 
Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 
69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, Psychodynamics]; Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the 
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599 
(1989-90) [hereinafter Perlin, Myths]. 
 9. Perlin, Political World, supra note 8, at 8 (“Any lawyer representing a severely mentally 
disabled criminal defendant must recognize that, if she enters an insanity defense plea, the jurors 
will likely be suspicious, negative, and hostile.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 8; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 8. 
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(that the insanity defense is a “rich man’s ploy”);11 that is, will the “rich 
and famous” be able to disproportionately rely on neuroimaging 
testimony in their trials?; (4) to what extent will sanism drive juror 
behavior in such cases;12 and (5) what are the therapeutic jurisprudence 
implications of the answers to all of these questions?13 
This paper will thus proceed as follows.  First, I will present a brief 
overview of neuroimaging.  Next, I will examine those factors about 
neuroimaging that might influence jurors in their deliberations.  After 
that, I will consider the case law that has developed in “neuroimaging 
cases,” focusing primarily on insanity cases.  I will then consider juror 
attitudes towards the insanity defense in general in an effort to determine 
what impact this evidence is likely to have on decision making in such 
cases.  Following this, I will consider clusters of collateral legal issues 
and attitudinal/social issues that need to be “on the table” during this 
analysis.  In my conclusion I will seek to answer the questions that I 
raised a moment ago. 
For my title, I draw on Bob Dylan’s vastly underrated (and no 
longer performed) masterpiece, “License to Kill.”14  Oliver Trager 
characterizes it as “a brooding meditation with apocalyptic undertones 
that takes on corruption and technology run amok,”15 which I think is 
just about perfect.  The verse upon which I rely is this: 
Now, he’s hell-bent for destruction, he’s afraid and confused  
And his brain has been mismanaged with great skill. 
All he believes are his eyes 
And his eyes, they just tell him lies. 
 
 11. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 18-19. 
 12. Id.  See also infra text accompanying notes 155-55. 
 13. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 
288-300 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE]; Michael L. Perlin, Representing Criminal 
Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases: Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas, U. 
P.R. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 14. BOB DYLAN, License to Kill, on INFIDELS (Sony Music Entertainment 1983) [hereinafter 
License to Kill], available at http://www.bobdylan.com/#/songs/license-kill.  Dylan last performed 
the song in person in Mountain View, CA, on Sept. 26, 1998.  See How Long Has It Been Since 
Dylan Played . . ., http://boblast.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
 15. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 376 
(2004). 
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But there’s a woman on my block, 
Sitting there in a cold chill. 
She say who gonna take away his license to kill?16 
Think about this topic in the context of these lines.  Will the use of 
neuroimaging make jurors more likely to believe that an individual has 
less free will than we have traditionally posited, and he “couldn’t help” 
doing what he did – that “his brain has been mismanaged with great 
skill”?17  Or will their pre-existing “ordinary common sensical” views 
about the insanity defense make them reject such evidence, believing 
that their eyes are “just tell[ing them] lies”?18 
II.  OVERVIEW 
Definitions of neuroimaging and brain imaging in the law and in 
the behavioral literature immediately warn us of some land mines.  “A 
brain image is the vivid representation of anatomy or physiology through 
a pictorial or graphic display of data.”19  Neuroimaging modalities “offer 
an objective, non-invasive, quantifiable image, which can provide useful 
information particularly when the clinical examination may otherwise be 
normal.”20  Through advances in neuroscience, “the ability of mental 
health professionals to assess [frontal lobe dysfunction] and its impact 
on impulse control is now sufficiently established to merit the 
introduction of such evidence in support of an insanity defense under a 
control test.”21  Neuroscience seems “advanced enough to enter forensic 
psychiatry.”22  “Advances in neurobiological research methods allow 
one to address the nature and biological basis of human behavior.”23  
And we assume that jurors can be counted on to critically evaluate such 
evidence.24 
 
 16. License to Kill, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Donald R. Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry, 31 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 89 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 20. Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the 
Courtroom, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 239, 247 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 21. Redding, supra note 5, at 101 (emphasis added). 
 22. Joachim Witzel et al., Neurophilosophical Perspectives of Neuroimaging in Forensic 
Psychiatry – Giving Way to a Paradigm Shift?, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 115 (2008). 
 23. Jurgen Muller et al., Disturbed Prefrontal and Temporal Brain Function During Emotion 
and Cognition Interaction in Criminal Psychopathy, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 131 (2008). 
 24. Dov Fox, Brain Imaging and the Bill of Rights: Memory Detection Technologies and 
American Criminal Justice, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 34, 36 (2008). 
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Some of this language jumps off the page: vivid, objective, 
quantifiable, advanced.  I note this because these are all factors that 
might have a significant impact on jury decision making in cases in 
which neuroimaging evidence is critically important to the case’s 
ultimate disposition; namely, these are all factors that might lead 
unwitting fact-finders to believe that the story told by the neuroimaging 
picture is susceptible to only one interpretation.  That, at the outset, is 
troubling. 
The reality is that neuroimaging is “fraught with uncertainties”25 
because the steps used in the production and presentation of 
neuroimaging evidence are “[n]ot only . . . not standardized, they are 
easily manipulated by a person with the knowledge of the technology.”26  
Some researchers characterize it as “indistinct.”27  Similarly, Amanda 
Pustilnik warns of “overreaching claims about the relationship between 
individual neurobiology and criminal violence.”28  Other scholars charge 
that “researchers, clinicians, and lawyers are seduced into becoming true 
believers in the merits of [brain imaging] for understanding the 
relationship between brain and behavior.”29  On this point, Professors 
Tancredi and Brodie stress that “an ideological approach to 
understanding the brain of those claiming insanity for their criminal 
actions would be one that holds on to an image as though it were the 
truth of what is being asserted about the brain.”30 
Scholars vacillate between positions that neuroimaging is like or is 
unlike other scientific evidence.31  Dov Fox finds “no reason to think 
that jurors will be any less capable of critically evaluating EEG or fMRI 
tests than they are of evaluating other types of scientific evidence.”32  
Alexandra Roberts considers analogies to both DNA and polygraph 
 
 25. Alexandra Roberts, Note, Everything New is Old Again: Brain Fingerprinting and 
Evidentiary Analogy, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 234, 266 n.155 (2007). 
 26. Reeves, supra note 19, at 90. 
 27. Timo Vloet et al., Structural and Functional MRI Findings in Children and Adolescents 
with Antisocial Behavior, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 99, 99 (2008). 
 28. Amanda Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2009). 
 29. Laurence Tancredi & Jonathan Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal 
Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 271, 289 (2007). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Compare Diane Hoffmann & Karen Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the 
Second Generation of Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858 (2007) (DNA tests), 
with Aimee Logan, Note, Who Says So? Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Science, 
Sentiment, and Consensus, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 195 (2008) (IQ tests). 
 32. Fox, supra note 24, at 36. 
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testimony, and finds them both wanting.33  But there is little doubt that 
“hard science” – neuroimaging certainly appears to be “hard science” – 
at the very least, in the words of a veteran death penalty defense lawyer, 
makes “Legislators stand up and listen.”34  Already, there has been a 
flurry of activity focusing on the question on whether neuroimaging can 
finally and conclusively shed light on (1) the roots and etiology of 
psychopathic behavior, and (2) accurately identifying who is a 
“psychopath.”35  Neuroimaging has even been discussed as a potential 
tool of counterterrorism.36 
My point is simple: the existence of neuroimaging techniques has 
changed the contours of the playing field, and no matter which side of 
the divide we find ourselves on, we must acknowledge that reality.37 
III.  FACTORS/FACT-FINDERS’ CONSTRUCTIONS 
I have identified a cluster of factors that we must think about 
seriously in an effort to understand how neuroimaging evidence will be 
construed by fact-finders: visualization, reductionism, the attribution 
heuristic, and the impact of a belief in “the CSI effect.”  I will discuss 
each of these briefly. 
A.  Visualization 
We start with the obvious.  Neuroimaging testimony is colorful38 
and grabs the viewer’s attention with representations that may “appear 
like holograms.”39  The visual “allure”40 can “dazzle[]” and “seduc[e]” 
 
 33. Roberts, supra note 25, at 248-49. 
 34. Jay Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 128 (2007). 
 35. See, e.g., Laura Guy & John Edens, Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Psychopathic 
Sexual Offenders, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 65 (2006); Muller et al., supra note 23; Sabrina Weber et al., 
Structural Brain Abnormalities in Psychopaths – A Review, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 7 (2008). 
 36. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 2; Sean Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric 
Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601 (2005). 
 37. To be cheeky, I could say by way of paraphrase of my muse, in homage to my colleague 
responsible for this Symposium, “Something’s happening here/and we don’t know what it is/Do we, 
Professor Moriarty?”  The lyrics, of course, are modified from “Ballad of a Thin Man.”  See Ballad 
of a Thin Man, http://www.bobdylan.com/#/songs/ballad-thin-man (last visited Sept. 9, 2008). 
 38. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1997). 
 39. Jane Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging in the U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 29, 45 n.133 (2008) (quoting Marks, supra note 2, at 486). 
 40. Laura Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging the Mind, Minding the Image: An 
Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 171, 182 (2007). 
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jurors41 in ways that are “inappropriately persuasive.”42  The fact that 
neuroimaging appears “interesting” may make it more impressive and 
probative to jurors than clinical or actuarial testimony.43  It is thus vivid, 
and forces us to re-consider the dominance and the power of the 
vividness heuristic, a cognitive-simplifying device through which a 
“single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, 
colorless data upon which rational choices should be made”;44 in this 
context, visual images are particularly vivid.45 
B.  Reductionism 
Professor Neil Feigenson concludes that these colorful depictions 
are inappropriately reductionist; neuroimaging testimony has the 
meretricious capacity to “reduce[] psychosocial complexity,”46 an error 
that encourages jurors to improperly misuse the cognitive-simplifying 
attribution heuristic – through which we “interpret a wide variety of 
additional information to reinforce pre-existing stereotypes”47 – in this 
sort of decision making.  This is the charge that Bruce Arrigo has thus 
asserted:  
In short, cognitive neuroscience’s ability to detect neuronal activity 
that allows the fMRI investigator to visualize and, presumably, 
understand how the brain reacts/thinks when presented with a series of 
questions such that these scanned activities can be measured 
accurately, is an overly reductionistic and deterministic perspective.48 
 
 41. Id. at 183, 185.  See also Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 29, at 289; Jennifer Kulynych, 
Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior: Neuroimaging as Scientific Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 
244 (1996) (using “seduction” or “seductive” as the descriptor); An Overview of the Impact of 
Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Law 10 (President’s Council on Bioethics Staff Working 
Paper), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/background/neuroscience_evidence.html (discussing 
how jurors can be “dazzled” by MRI displays). 
 42. Neil Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and 
Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J. L CONTEXT 233, 243 (2006). 
 43. Moriarty, supra note 39, at 48. 
 44. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1417. 
 45. Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of 
Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 89 n.154 (1991). 
 46. Feigenson, supra note 42, at 248. 
 47. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1417. 
 48. Arrigo, supra note 4, at 474.  See also Marks, supra note 2, at 492 (discussing Tom 
Buller’s critique of “reductionist neuroscience” and citing to Tom Buller, Brains, Lies and 
Psychological Explanations, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE AND 
POLICY 51 (Judy Illes ed., 2005)).  See also Pustilnik, supra note 28, (discussing “brain-based 
reductionism in criminal law” and “major tenets of brain-behavior reductionism that historically 
have been manifest in past episodes of brain sciences in the criminal law”). 
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C.  Attributionism 
The attribution heuristic teaches us that we “overattribute others’ 
behavior to the kinds of people they are rather than to the circumstances 
in which they find themselves.”49  We have always sought to attribute 
human behavior, in the words of Laura Khoshbin and Shahram 
Khoshbin, “to a physical source within the head.”50  This desire is 
intensified when we seek to explain violence, especially either 
otherwise-inexplicable violence or political violence.51  The potential for 
concern is exacerbated further by what Professor David Faigman and his 
colleagues have characterized as “the general lack of scientific literacy 
among Americans, including lawyers and judges.”52 
D.  “The CSI Effect” 
All participants in the criminal justice system agree on one thing: 
the existence of what is called “the CSI effect.”53  What this means is 
fairly clear – jurors (and presumably judges) are so inured to the 
ubiquity of forensic evidence from the “leave no doubt” crime solver on 
TV police procedural shows that there is an expectation that such 
evidence will be presented in all criminal trials.54  In truth, this belief is 
based on anecdotal evidence (some of it stupefying),55 and jurors’ 
 
 49. Feigenson, supra note 42, at 248 (quoting RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN 
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980)). 
 50. Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 40, at 171. 
 51. See Marks, supra note 2; Thompson, supra note 36. 
 52. David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: 
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific 
Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1834-35 (1994). 
 53. As of Oct. 4, 2008, a simple WESTLAW JLR search for “CSI effect” showed 106 
documents in which that phrase was used. 
 54. According to a recent article by Wendy Brickell, there are actually two effects: 
One view is that the CSI (crime scene investigation) effect increases the burden on the 
prosecution by creating a greater expectation that scientific evidence will be presented at 
trial.  The other view is that the CSI effect increases the defense’s burden--forcing 
defense attorneys to overcome jurors’ perception that scientific evidence is infallible. 
Wendy Brickell, Is It the CSI Effect or Do We Just Distrust Juries?, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (2008). 
 55. According to Judge Donald Shelton, “I once heard a juror complain that the prosecution 
had not done a thorough job because ‘they didn’t even dust the lawn for fingerprints.’”  Donald E. 
Shelton, The “CSI Effect”: Does It Really Exist, NAT’L INST. JUST., Mar. 2008, at 1, 2.  Monica 
Robbers points out that jurors “appear to have no tools to assess the credibility of forensic testing on 
television shows or in trials.”  Monica Robbers, Blinded by Science: The Social Construction of 
Reality in Forensic Television Shows and Its Effect on Criminal Jury Trials, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y 
REV. 84 (2008). 
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expectations of forensic evidence vary with the type of case.56  The valid 
and reliable evidence that such a CSI effect exists in jurors’ minds – to 
the extent that they demand the “money shot” of hard forensic evidence 
in all trials – is scant.57  But, the fact remains that participants in the 
criminal justice system believe that jurors believe in this effect.58  And 
that is what needs to be confronted: this perception, whether or not it is 
seriously flawed. 
E.  Conclusion 
Fact-finders must consider these factors carefully, as each one has 
the capacity to distort the meaning, the weight and the “truth” of 
neuroimaging testimony.  It is now necessary to consider the array of 
case law in which neuroimaging evidence has been considered in an 
effort to determine what impact, if any, these factors have had. 
III.  NEUROIMAGING IN CASE LAW 
A.  Introduction 
How has neuroimaging been dealt with in the case law?  A recent 
article characterizes the legal system as having been “quick” to 
incorporate brain-imaging evidence into the trial process, finding 130 
reported cases involving PET and SPECT brain imaging evidence and 
two with fMRI evidence.59  Professor Mark Pettit has offered a four-part 
categorization of the types of cases in which such testimony might be 
used – cases involving brain structure, brain function, prediction of 
future behavior, and lie detection60 – and suggests that admissibility 
problems increase as “one moves from use one to use four.”61 
 
 56. Donald Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific 
Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 358 (2006).  See also id. 
at 362 (“[S]urvey results did not show that the demand for scientific evidence as proof of guilt was 
related to watching crime related television programs.”). 
 57. See generally id. 
 58. Khoshbin & Khoshbin, supra note 40, at 182. 
 59. Yaling Yang et al., Brain Abnormalities in Antisocial Individuals: Implications for the 
Law, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 65, 77-78 (2008).  Yang and colleagues rely on Prof. Feigenson’s study 
for their data.  See Feigenson, supra note 42, at 237 (as Feigenson’s search was done over two years 
ago, it suggests that the present number would reasonably be significantly higher). 
 60. Mark Pettit, FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
33 AM. J. L. & MED. 319, 320-23 (2007). 
 61. Id. at 321. 
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While the “high card” cases that are well known to the public are 
primarily criminal – this being a perfect example of the vividness 
heuristic – a significant number of these cases involve such civil matters 
as: 
 - removal of a vegetative-state child from life supports;62 
 - trauma suffered by victims of brain injuries;63 
 - testamentary capacity;64 
 - disability claims;65 
 - toxic tort exposure;66 and 
 - the relationship between violent behavior and video games.67 
B.  High Profile Criminal Cases 
Not surprisingly, there has been far less academic (and media) 
attention paid to most of these cases than to the handful of high profile 
criminal cases involving neuroimaging testimony.68  Of these, the two 
most prominent (or perhaps notorious) have been the cases of Vincent 
Gigante and John Hinckley.69 
1.  Gigante 
Vincent Gigante, allegedly the “boss” of a New York organized 
crime family, was well known for walking the streets of Greenwich 
Village in New York in a bathrobe and slippers, muttering to himself.70  
At his trial, he presented a number of well-credentialed experts to testify 
 
 62. Moriarty, supra note 39, at 40-41. 
 63. Id. at 39, 41. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 41-42; Petit, supra note 60, at 337. 
 66. Kulynych, supra note 38, at 240-41; Pettit, supra note 60, at 336; Snead, supra note 1, at 
1291. 
 67. Snead, supra note 1, at 1292. 
 68. In addition to the cases discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 70-88, 
neuroimaging has also been used in cases involving (1) potential reduction in degrees of homicide, 
Moriarty, supra note 39, at 39, (2) capacity of a defendant to plead guilty, id. at 44, and (3) the 
penalty phase of a death penalty trial, id. at 45; Snead, supra note 1, at 1308 n.215.  It has also been 
discussed extensively in the context of the juvenile death penalty.  See, e.g., Snead, supra note 1, at 
1302-06; Aronson, supra note 34 at 128; D. Brian Woo, Cudgel or Carrot: How Roper v. Simmons 
Will Affect Plea Bargaining in the Juvenile System, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 475 (2007); Kathryn 
Lynn Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and 
Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78 (2008).  See Snead, supra note 1, at 1291-93 nn.125-37 
(for a listing of relevant cases (civil and criminal)). 
 69. See infra note 89. 
 70. See Joseph A. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the 
Courtroom, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 239, 250-51 (2007). 
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that he was not competent to stand trial.71  In support of this position, 
Mr. Gigante sought to present PET scans to bolster the clinical diagnoses 
of dementia and/or Alzheimer’s disease; however, these tests were 
rejected due to “speculative scientific theories,” lack of baseline studies, 
and the limited number of controls.72  The trial court concluded that the 
evidence was unreliable, and neither credible nor persuasive.73 
A simple GOOGLE search of “Gigante and ‘PET scan’” reveals 
281 documents.74  This was a case that was the subject of intense 
publicity and is about as vivid an example as is imaginable.75  Some 
observers believed that it formed the basis of the storyline in The 
Sopranos in which Uncle Junior feigned incompetence (an ironic 
backdrop to his later development of authentic symptoms of 
incompetence).76  We are left here with the conclusion drawn by Elyn 
Saks and Stephen Behnke about overly vivid evidence in general: 
“[E]ven generally effective decision makers who indisputably have the 
ability to form accurate beliefs misuse statistics, misunderstand 
probabilities, and accord undue weight to vivid examples.”77 
2.  Hinckley 
Twenty-three years ago, I had this to say about the John W. 
Hinckley case: 
Separate streams of public opinion-outrage over the courts’ perceived 
“softness on crime”; . . . outrage over a jurisprudential system that 
could even allow a defendant who shot the President in cold blood (on 
national television) to plead “not guilty” (by any reason); outrage at a 
jurisprudential system that countenanced obfuscatory and confusing 
 
 71. United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 72. Id.; see Moriarty, supra note 39, at 39-40; Pettit, supra note 60, at 335-36; see also Baskin 
et al., supra note 70; PETER MAAS, UNDERBOSS 297-98 (1997). 
 73. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. at 148. 
 74. Search done Oct. 4, 2008. 
 75. My admittedly impressionistic recollection is that it was given Britney Spears-type 
coverage by both NYC tabloids as long as it was before the courts.  On the impact of media focus 
on the reinforcement of stereotypes in vivid cases involving individuals with mental illness, see 
Matthias Angermeyer & Beate Schulze, Reinforcing Stereotypes: How the Focus on Forensic Cases 
in News Reporting May Influence Public Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill, 24 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 469 (2001). 
 76. See The Sopranos: Whoever Did This (HBO television broadcast Nov. 10, 2002), 
available at http://www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season4/episode48.shtml, cited in Terry 
Maroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,” and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1377 n.7 (2006). 
 77. Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research: 
MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 115 (1999). 
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testimony by competing teams of psychiatrists as to the proper 
characterization of a defendant's mental illness; in short, outrage over 
the “abuse” of the insanity defense—became a river of fury after the . . 
. verdict was announced.78 
Exactly why the jury found Hinckley not guilty by reason of 
insanity is, of course, an open question.79  The trial court permitted an 
expert witness to introduce a CT scan that purportedly showed a 
“widening” of sulci in Hinckley’s brain in support of the witness’s 
diagnosis of schizophrenia,80 notwithstanding the reality that “there is no 
known ‘normal’ figure of sulcal width.”81  Hinckley’s expert witness had 
said this about the CT test: “As an instrument for viewing the brain, I 
think it is absolutely unquestioned.  It is considered the greatest 
diagnostic advance perhaps in the last fifty years.  It is used routinely.”82 
Although Lincoln Caplan, the author of the most important book 
written about the Hinckley trial, concluded that the CT scan 
“accomplished less than the defense would have liked, and less than the 
government had feared,” and that “it was not likely that anyone in court 
had seen the scans as the clincher;”83 and although Jennifer Kulynych 
characterizes the evidence as a “red herring;”84 other scholars have taken 
the position (in which I concur)85 that trial observers “seem to agree that 
the abnormal CAT scans of Hinckley’s brain were highly instrumental in 
his acquittal.”86 
Certainly, the verdict in this case – that I have characterized as 
“perhaps the most vivid insanity defense trial in American legal 
history”87 – brought to the public’s attention the potential use of 
 
 78. Michael L. Perlin, The Things We Do for Love: John Hinckley’s Trial and the Future of 
the Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 857, 859 (1985) (book review) 
(emphasis in original). 
 79. I discuss this at length in PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 13-16, 333-48.  See 
also, Perlin, supra note 78; Perlin, Myths, supra note 8; Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8; Perlin, 
Political World, supra note 8. 
 80. Kulynych, supra note 38, at 1252. 
 81. Id. 
 82. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 79 
(1984).  Contra Vloet et al., supra note 27, at 99 (“MRI is still a rather . . . indistinct method for 
forensic assessment.”). 
 83. Id. at 85. 
 84. Kulynych, supra note 38, at 1257. 
 85. See Perlin, Myths, supra note 8, at 721-22 (“[T]he most persuasive testimony presented in 
the Hinckley trial consisted of abnormal CAT scans.”). 
 86. Lawrence T. White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5 
BEHAV.SCI. & L. 411, 417 (1987). 
 87. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1420. 
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neuroscience evidence in high-profile criminal cases.  It is not a surprise 
that we are still dealing with the fallout from that decision.88 
In short, the public’s knowledge of neuroscience-in-the-law may be 
disproportionately skewed by its knowledge of high-profile cases 
(especially high-profile criminal cases), and its inaccurately assuming 
that these cases are representative of other/all cases.89  Those who are 
interested in this question must deal with this reality, no matter which 
side of the neuroscience-evidence-is-good/neuroscience-evidence-is-bad 
divide they fall. 
IV.  JUROR ATTITUDES 
With all this backdrop, I will segue into the heart of this paper – 
what impact, if any, the introduction of this “new” evidence will have on 
the ways that jurors construe insanity defense evidence.  To answer this 
question, I will briefly review juror response to insanity defense 
testimony in general, and will then speculate as to how – given these 
attitudes – jurors will likely respond to neuroimaging evidence if it is 
used more frequently. 
A.  Attitudes in General 
The research about how jurors think about the insanity defense and 
defendants who plead insanity has revealed a cluster of consistent 
attitudes: 
1.  We know that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes toward the insanity 
defense as a defense are the strongest predictor of individual 
verdicts,90 and that jurors bring “their own personal sense of 
 
 88. There have been other locally – and regionally – high profile cases involving 
neuroimaging testimony.  See e.g., United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(discussing a multi-million dollar fraud case where the defendant was a former Congressman); 
People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (discussing a murder case in which 
the victim was Kendra Webdale, after whom NY’s assisted outpatient treatment law was named), 
rev’d on other grounds, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005).  Both cases are discussed in this context in 
Moriarty, supra note 39, at 43-44. 
 89. This exemplifies the “representativeness” heuristic that leads individuals to extrapolate 
overconfidently based upon a small sample size of which they happen to be aware.  See e.g., Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23, 24-25 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).  I discuss 
the implications of Tversky and Kahneman’s insights for insanity defense cases in Perlin, 
Psychodynamics, supra note 8. 
 90. Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L. Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal 
Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 349, 372 (1991). 
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justice” to their insanity defense deliberations, including 
“attitudes about the morality of the insanity defense and the 
punishment of mentally ill offenders.”91 
2.  The notion of any defense that allows criminals to claim they 
were not responsible for acts that they admittedly did92 is 
rejected in total by a significant percentage of the population.93 
3.  Jurors construct mental disability as an “all or nothing” 
concept,94 and when forced to choose a substantive insanity 
test, select the eighteenth century, pre-M’Naghten, “wild beast” 
test95 as the one that most comports with their “ordinary 
common sense” (OCS) concepts of justice.96 
4.  An overwhelming number of potential jurors distrust expert 
testimony that is proffered to offer an exculpatory mental 
status-related explanation for what would otherwise be criminal 
behavior.97  This distrust flows from what I have characterized 
as the “fear of faking,”98 the concern that self-reported 
symptoms (e.g., “I hear voices” and “Napoleon told me to do 
 
 91. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 298-99 (4th 
ed. 1998) (emphasis added).  On how morality issues are constructed in the neuroimaging debate, 
see infra text accompanying notes 136-41. 
 92. One cannot plead the insanity defense unless one concedes that the actus reus was 
committed.  See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983) (“A verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a 
criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, “Plain Crazy:” Lay Definitions of Legal Insanity, 
7 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 105, 110 (1984) (noting that public opinion polls have consistently 
shown a majority of Americans believe the insanity defense is a “loophole that allows too many 
guilty people to go free.”); Caton Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: 
Decision Making and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 207, 225 (reporting that 66% 
of the population expresses an opinion that insanity should not be a defense). 
 94. Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of 
Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 228 (1996); id. at 
228 n.176 (quoting James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art: “Representation” in Capital Cases, 8 YALE 
J.L & HUMAN. 417, 445 (1996)) (“[T]here will be enormous pressures to craft a representation that 
earns the defendant membership in a preexisting, stereotypical category of ‘acute’ or ‘extreme’ 
illness, and to show that he fits into that category all of the time – that he is all sickness, no 
function.”) (alteration in original). 
 95. Roberts & Golding, supra note 90, at 223-24. 
 96. See, e.g., Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 8, at 8 (“[O]rdinary common sense” refers to a 
“self-referential and non-reflective” way of constructing the world “(‘I see it that way, therefore 
everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that’s the way it is’).”). 
 97. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Venirepersons’s Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense: 
Developing, Refining, and Validating a Scale, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 623 (2004). 
 98. See generally Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8. 
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it”) are inherently falsifiable and that testimony that depends on 
such self-reports is inherently untrustworthy.99 
5.  Juror attitudes consistently reflect what I have frequently 
characterized as “sanist” thinking;100 in insanity cases, jurors 
demonstrate what I have characterized as “irrational brutality, 
prejudice, hostility, and hatred toward insanity pleaders.”101  
Think of some of the sanist myths upon which jurors rely: 
-  reliance on a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual 
images of craziness; 
-  an obsessive fear of feigned mental states; 
-  a presumed absolute linkage between mental illness and 
dangerousness; 
-  sanctioning of the death penalty in the case of mentally 
retarded defendants, some defendants who are 
“substantially mentally impaired,” or defendants who 
have been found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI); 
-  the incessant confusion and conflation of substantive 
mental status tests; and 
-  the regularity of sanist appeals by prosecutors in 
insanity defense summations, arguing that insanity 
defenses are easily faked, that insanity acquittees are 
 
 99. Justice Scalia embraces this myth.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 354 (2002) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting).  Justice Scalia states: 
Nothing has changed the accuracy of Matthew Hale’s endorsement of the common law’s 
traditional method for taking account of guilt-reducing factors, written over three 
centuries ago: 
“[Determination of a person’s incapacity] is a matter of great difficulty, partly 
from the easiness of counterfeiting this disability . . . and partly from the 
variety of the degrees of this infirmity, whereof some are sufficient, and some 
are insufficient to excuse persons in capital offenses . . . .” 
Id. (alteration and omissions in original). 
I critique this position in Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to 
Atkins, 33 N. MEX. L. REV. 315, 330-31 (2003), and Michael L. Perlin, Recent Criminal Legal 
Decisions: Implications for Forensic Mental Health Experts, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: 
EMERGING TOPICS AND EXPANDING ROLES 333, 339-41(Alan Goldstein ed., 2006). 
 100. Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role 
of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL. 239, 257 
(1994) (“[J]urors reflect and project the conventional morality of the community, and judicial 
decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate 
sanist stereotypes.”) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanist Lives of Jurors].  See Christian Breheny et al., 
Gender Matters in the Insanity Defense, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 93 (2007) (reporting on valid 
and reliable research confirming the role of sanism in insanity defense attitudes). 
 101. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 317. 
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often immediately released, and that expert witnesses 
are readily duped.102 
6.  Juror attitudes further continue to reify a series of behavioral 
myths: 
Myth #1: The insanity defense is overused.103 
Myth #2:  The use of the insanity defense is limited to 
murder cases.104 
Myth #3:  There is no risk to the defendant who pleads 
insanity.105 
Myth #4:  NGRI acquittees are quickly released from 
custody.106 
Myth #5:  NGRI acquittees spend much less time in 
custody than do defendants convicted of the 
same offenses.107 
Myth #6:  Criminal defendants who plead insanity are 
usually faking.108 
7.  None of this is at all new.  170 years ago, Isaac Ray wrote, “the 
jury is seldom a proper tribunal for distinguishing the true from 
the false, and fixing on each its rightful value.”109 
 
8.  On the other hand, jurors are less suspicious of expert 
testimony that is premised on organic (rather than 
psychodynamic) evidence.110 
 
 102. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1422. 
 103. Perlin, Myths, supra note 8, at 648. 
 104. Id. at 649. 
 105. Id. at 650. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 651. 
 108. Id.  According to Professor Jennifer Skeem and her colleagues, these myths are often 
“inflexible.”  See Skeem et al., supra note 97, at 625. 
 109. Catherine Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical 
Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 959 (2004) (citing ISAAC RAY, A TREATISE ON THE 
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 59 (1838)). 
 110. Phoebe Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 81, 84 (1984).  See generally Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1407-08 (citing 
Kulynych, supra note 38) (“The sense among the legal community and the general public that there 
is something different about mental illness and organic illness, so that, while certain physiological 
disabilities may be seen as legitimately exculpatory, emotional handicaps are not.”). 
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I first focused on these myths in my writing nearly 20 years ago.111  
Researchers – mostly forensic psychologists – that have tested my 
assumptions have basically confirmed that they are an accurate picture 
of juror behavior.112  But this research has not yet focused on the topic 
before us today: what impact neuroimaging evidence will have on jurors 
in insanity defense cases? 
This is a difficult question for many reasons, not the least of which 
is the conflict – perhaps, to borrow a term from constitutional analysis, 
an “incredible dilemma”113 – it poses between two clusters of beliefs.  
On one hand, neuroimaging evidence – facially “objective,” facially less 
susceptible to falsification efforts, facially “hard science” – appears to be 
the sort of evidence that jurors “prefer” in insanity defense cases.  On the 
other, however, the level of juror antipathy to the insanity defense is 
profound.  And this is the question to which behavioral researchers will 
next need to turn their attention: which of these attitudes will, 
eventually, “trump” the other? 
To answer this question with any degree of confidence, we need to 
focus more on the impact of sanism. 
B.  A “Rich Man’s Defense”? 
There is one “wild card” attitude issue that requires special 
attention here.  Another important myth about the use of the insanity 
defense – one repeated time after time at the Congressional hearings on 
potential defense abolition that were held following the Hinckley trial – 
is that it is a “rich man’s defense,”114 a description that I have previously 
characterized as “a textbook parody of empirical and behavioral 
reality.”115  The evidence has disproven this myth; the defense is not 
used disproportionately in cases of wealthy defendants.116 
 
 111. See Perlin, Myths, supra note 8; Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 8. 
 112. See, e.g., Breheny et al., supra note 100, at 96-99; Carmen Cirincione & Charles Jacobs, 
Identifying Insanity Acquittals: Is It Any Easier?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 495 (1999). 
 113. See Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the 
Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 742 (1981).  I discuss this in a different mental 
disability law context in Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual 
Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC’L CHANGE 517, 540 (1993-94). 
 114. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 18. 
 115. Id. at 19. 
 116. See Hearings on Bills to Amend Title 18 to Limit the Insanity Defense Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1982) (testimony of Dr. Henry Steadman); see also 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 14, 22-23 (1983) (criticizing as unfounded the 
proposition that the insanity defense is a “rich-man’s defense”). 
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But the myth persists, and to some extent, that is not a surprise.  
Again, think of the vividness heuristic: most high profile cases involving 
the insanity defense are cases that are the focus of exaggerated media 
attention,117 thus creating the illusion that these cases are reflective of 
the entire universe of insanity cases, or even the entire universe of all 
cases.118 
However, there may be some truth to this myth in the case of 
insanity pleaders who seek to use neuroimaging evidence in support of 
their plea, in large part because of the extra expenses that would be 
incurred in such cases.119  In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court ruled 
that an indigent criminal defendant who makes a threshold showing that 
insanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial is constitutionally 
entitled to a psychiatrist’s assistance.120  “Generally speaking the courts 
have read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require appointment of an 
expert unless it is absolutely essential to the defense.”121  More to the 
point, lower courts have, to this point in time, been generally reluctant to 
extend Ake to requests for funding for neuroimaging tests.122 
 
 117. See Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 8, at 1-2 (“Some day, someone will probably propose 
dividing all law cases into two categories: those that make the national news and those that do 
not.”); id. (discussing “how the public heuristically uses the vivid case as a representative of all 
cases”). 
 118. See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the “Search 
for Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996) (“[T]he [O.J.]Simpson case is 
so aberrant that it does not even represent a very useful piece of empirical evidence [as to how the 
criminal justice system can be improved].”); see Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1407 (“In the 
words of a thirteen-year-old . . . writing about the O.J. trial to the Fresno Bee: Of course, if he did 
do it, there’s always the good old temporary insanity defense, a sure-fire way to bail out of just 
about any heinous crime, especially murder.”). 
 119. Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 437, 460 (1993) (“Affluent defendants have access to better legal 
services generally.  Utilization of the insanity defense involves no more class bias than other 
defenses.”). 
 120. 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).  See generally 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 9A-5.1, at 217-27 (2d ed. 2002). 
 121. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th 
ed. 2000).  See also David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond 
Reach for the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REV. 763, 783 (1990) (“Lower courts often have interpreted Ake 
less than generously, unduly constricting the availability of the right.”). 
 122. Compare, e.g., Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 16-17 (Fla. 1999) (rehearing denied Dec. 10, 
1999) (finding no Ake violation where defendant sought additional expert assistance in establishing 
functional organic brain damage), and Smith v. Kearney, No. 2 CA-SA 2008-0019, 2008 WL 
2721155 (Ariz. App. 2008) (finding no Ake error where defendant sought funds for a PET scan), 
with People v. Jones, 620 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (reversing conviction because 
of refusal to fund brain scans).  Jones is discussed in this context in Kulynych, supra note 38, at 
1254, and Pettit, supra note 60, at 335. 
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And, since, predictably, the neuroimaging-mental status cases 
(here, I am combining insanity and incompetency cohorts) that have 
received the most attention – again, the vividness heuristic – are, besides 
Hinckley and Gigante, cases such as Mezvinsky and Goldstein.123  This 
further accentuates this perception of reality.  Because of the distortion 
effect of famous cases, until neuroimaging evidence is used more 
frequently in what I have called “invisible cases,”124 our speculations can 
only remain tentative. 
V.  OTHER LEGAL AND BEHAVIORAL/SOCIAL ISSUES 
A.  Introduction 
There are other constellations of legal and behavioral/social issues 
that need to be unpacked in this inquiry, issues that have, as of yet, 
received little attention in the academic literature.  First, in addition to 
the Ake-related issues already discussed, there are three other legal 
issues that need further consideration: (1) the defendant’s competency to 
consent to the imposition of a neuroimaging test or examination; (2) the 
impact of medications – specifically, antipsychotic medications – on a 
defendant’s brain at the time that such a test is performed; and (3) the 
evidentiary rules that govern the admissibility of such testimony as 
related to limits on a witness’s testimonial expertise.  There is currently 
little in the academic literature about these issues, but it is not especially 
bold to predict that more attention to such issues should become more 
common in the future.125 
In addition, there are other behavioral and social issues to consider: 
(1) the extent to which the specter of malingering will continue to hold 
thrall over jurors deliberating in any insanity case; (2) the extent to 
which neuroimaging evidence will “trump” false OCS in juror 
deliberations; and (3) the extent to which neuroimaging evidence will (a) 
have an impact on the moral stigma experienced by some insanity 
 
 123. See supra note 88. 
 124. See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2000) (“[T]he 
overwhelming number of cases involving mental disability law issues are ‘litigated’” in pitch 
darkness.  Involuntary civil commitment cases are routinely disposed of in minutes behind closed 
courtroom doors.”) [hereinafter Law of Healing]. 
 125. See Michael L. Perlin, “And I Can See Through Your Brain”: Access to Experts, 
Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the 
Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337219. 
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pleaders and (b) change our moral intuitions about the insanity defense.  
These are issues that cry out for more attention. 
B.  Legal Issues 
1.  Competency to Consent 
In a recent article, Jennifer Kulynych raises the important – but as 
of yet, rarely discussed – issue of the need to determine whether a 
defendant is competent to consent to the administration of neuroimaging 
tests,126 noting that there is currently “no federal regulatory bar to 
enrolling such adults in an MRI study.”127  The question of competency 
to consent to treatment and testing has become the focus of great 
attention in the past thirty years,128 and it is a question that the US 
Supreme Court has considered several times in the context of the 
administration of antipsychotic medication in both civil and criminal 
cases,129 concluding that “a qualified right to refuse medication is 
located in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”130  Yet, 
there has been no reported litigation on this specific issue.  It is certainly 
reasonable to suggest that this is something we should be alert for in the 
coming years. 
2.  Medication 
Five years ago, in an article about brain imaging and the law, Dr. 
Donald Reeves and his associates stressed that “psychotropic drugs 
affect functional imaging of the brain,” and that the effects of such drugs 
“are not always short-lived.”131  Given the reality that the Supreme Court 
 
 126. Jennifer Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging Research: Disentangling the 
Gordian Knot, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 295, 312-13 (2007). 
 127. Id. at 313. 
 128. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY 
TO CLINICAL APPLICATION (2008). 
 129. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (discussing the right to refuse 
treatment in prisons); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (discussing the right to refuse 
treatment at insanity defense trial); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (discussing the right 
to refuse treatment in the determination of defendant’s competency to stand trial); Mills v. Rogers, 
457 U.S. 291 (1982) (noting that the state may recognize greater liberty interests for persons with 
mental illness than the U.S. Constitution). 
 130. Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/ Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve 
Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 735, 736 (2005). 
 131. Reeves, supra note 19, at 92. 
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– in establishing its jurisprudence of the right-to-refuse-psychotropic-
drug-treatment – has stressed that “the pervasiveness of side effects is a 
key factor in the determination of the scope of the right,”132 it comes as a 
surprise that this insight has not – as of yet – been discussed elsewhere 
in the legal literature.133  Again, especially in cases that involve 
individuals institutionalized against their will in matters that involve the 
criminal trial process, it is reasonable to predict that this will be the 
subject of important future consideration. 
3.  Evidentiary Rules 
Both Reeves and Kulynych counsel great caution in decisions as to 
the admissibility of neuroimaging tests.134  Reeves said: “The psychiatric 
expert who uses brain imaging in the courtroom must face the 
limitations of the technology and not overstate what the image 
reveals.”135  Adding to Reeves, Kulynych said: “[A] competent 
psychiatric witness should readily acknowledge the limited evidentiary 
purposes for which neuroimaging is currently appropriate.”136  A 
Daubert analysis is beyond the scope of this paper,137 but this certainly 
must remain “on the table” for all who are interested in this question.  
The fact that Dr. Alan Felthous and a colleague have stated flatly, 
“[b]rain imaging for assessment of criminal responsibility . . . would not 
be appropriate,”138 is certainly sobering from this perspective.  And, it is 
obligatory to note the disparity in decision making; that is, in Daubert 
cases the prosecutor’s position is sustained (either in support of 
questioned expertise or in opposition to it) vastly more often than is that 
 
 132. Perlin, Law of Healing, supra note 124, at 736.  See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 
166, 179 (2003).  The Court states: 
The Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs 
to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that 
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, 
and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further 
important governmental trial-related interests. 
Id. 
 133. Reeves’ article is cited in Snead, supra note 1, Redding, supra note 5, and Tancredi & 
Brodie, supra note 29, but on other points. 
 134. See Reeves, supra note 19; Kulynych, supra note 38. 
 135. Reeves, supra note 19, at 96. 
 136. Kulynych, supra note 38, at 1259. 
 137. But see Snead, supra note 1, at 1272 n.25; Kulynych, supra note 38, at 1264-70 
(discussing the relationship between Daubert and this evidence); see generally Pettit, supra note 60. 
 138. Alan Felthous & Henning Sass, Introduction to this Issue: International Perspectives on 
Brain Imaging and the Law, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1, 1 (2008). 
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of defense counsel’s.139  The implications of these findings must be 
considered as well. 
C.  Attitudinal and Behavioral Issues 
1.  The Specter of Malingering 
If we are discussing the insanity defense, we cannot avoid the 
specter of malingering.  I wrote this about eight years ago and believe it 
is still apt today: 
[T]he fear that defendants will fake the insanity defense to escape 
punishment continues to paralyze the legal system in spite of an 
impressive array of empirical evidence that reveals (1) the minuscule 
number of such cases, (2) the ease with which trained clinicians are 
usually able to catch malingering in such cases, (3) the inverse greater 
likelihood that defendants, even at grave peril to their life, will be more 
likely to try to convince examiners that they're not crazy, (4) the high 
risk in pleading the insanity defense (leading to statistically significant 
greater prison terms meted out to unsuccessful insanity pleaders), and 
(5) that most successful insanity pleaders remain in maximum security 
facilities for a far greater length of time than they would have had they 
been convicted on the underlying criminal indictment.140 
But what is especially intriguing here is some preliminary evidence 
that of “the existence and involvement of a prefrontal-parietal-sub-
cortical circuit in feigned memory impairment.”141  Given the fact that 
 
 139. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty 
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 105-08 (2000).  In sixty-seven cases of challenged 
government expertise, the prosecution prevailed in sixty-one of these.  Id. at 105.  Out of fifty-four 
complaints by criminal defendants that their expertise was improperly excluded, the defendant lost 
in forty-four of these.  Id. at 106.  Contrarily, in civil cases, ninety percent of Daubert appeals were 
by the defendants, who prevailed two-thirds of the time.  Id. at 108.  For a thoughtful analysis of 
Professor Risinger’s findings, see Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence 
Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381, 382-84 (2007). 
Prof. Susan Rozelle is blunter: “The game of scientific evidence looks fixed.”  Susan Rozelle, 
Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. 
REV. 597, 598 (2007). 
 140. Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the 
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 236 
(2000) (alteration in original). 
 141. Michael Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 301, 308 (2006) (citing research reported on in Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002)).  The research 
done by Lee and her colleagues is also discussed in, inter alia, Stacey Tovino, Functional 
Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 428-29 
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forensic experts are often “trained to be suspicious of malingering,”142 
we need to think about the ways that neuroimaging might turn into the 
prosecutor’s “trump card” in efforts to cast the insanity-pleading 
defendant as a malingerer.143 
2.  The Role of OCS 
Michael Pardo states flatly that neuroimaging evidence is 
significant, in part, because it “provides jurors with . . . information . . . 
beyond their common-sense background understanding.”144  Joshua 
Greene and Jonathan Cohen predict that neuroscience evidence will 
“undermine people’s common sense,” referring specifically to the 
public’s “libertarian conception of free will and the retributivist thinking 
that depends on it.”145 
I have identified false ordinary common sense (OCS)146 as one of 
the factors that “contaminate[s]” insanity defense practice.147  It is an 
open and important question as to whether the contrary-to-OCS aspects 
of this evidence will have a decontaminating effect on the jury process in 
insanity cases.148 
 
(2007).  See also Charles N. W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural 
Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 544 (2006) (noting that neuroimaging 
techniques that reveal deception might inform assessments of malingered pain). 
 142. Richard Dudley & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: History Investigation as the 
Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 978 (2008). 
 143. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Everything’s a Little Upside Down, As a Matter of Fact the 
Wheels Have Stopped”: The Fraudulence of the Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239, 250 (2004) (“[C]ourts resolutely adhere to the conviction that defendants 
regularly malinger and feign incompetency . . . .”). 
 144. Pardo, supra note 141, at 318. 
 145. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B. 1775, 1776 (2004) (emphasis added).  See 
generally Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PUB. LIB. SCI. BIOL. 0693, 0695 
(Apr. 2007), available at http://biology.plosjournals.org/archive/1545-
7885/5/4/pdf/10.1371_journal.pbio.0050103-L.pdf (noting that neuroscience may play an 
“important role” in “updating the intuitions concerning free will and responsibility that may 
implicitly underlie juror deliberations”). 
 146. See supra note 96. 
 147. See Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 8, at 17; PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 
305-10. 
 148. See Jennifer Louden & Jennifer Skeem, Constructing Insanity: Jurors’ Prototypes, 
Attitudes, and Legal Decision-Making, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 449, 465 (2007) (stating that people are 
resistant to information meant to correct their misconceptions about the insanity defense). 
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3.  Moral Stigma and Moral Intuitions 
A consortium of German research psychiatrists has argued that 
acceptance of neuroscience testimony may ultimately “reduce the moral 
stigma society currently attributes to offenders and criminals,” as society 
may learn – from such testimony – that crimes and offenses can be 
considered “as symptoms of a mental disease.”149  Greene and Cohen 
suggest further that, “[i]f neuroscience can change [society’s moral 
intuitions], then neuroscience can change the law.”150  All this, however, 
must be considered in the context of the critique that alleges that mental 
health professionals have all too often sought inappropriately “to replace 
the moral determination of criminal responsibility with a scientific 
determination.”151 
But if, as Judge David Bazelon maintained, the insanity defense 
was primarily a “moral” inquiry for the jury,152 and if it is that area of 
the law where, as Professor Andrew Taslitz states, “law and morality 
overtly blend,”153 then, again, the potential impact of neuroscience 
evidence in this area of the law remains significant.  However, we 
cannot do this without keeping in mind Amanda Pustilnik’s admonition 
that “mental illness [is seen] as reflecting a defect of morality or will.”154 
When we talk about law and morality (especially in the context of 
the criminal justice process in cases of defendants with mental 
disabilities who commit, on-the-surface, inexplicable acts), I must turn 
 
 149. Witzel et al., supra note 22, at 127. 
 150. Greene & Cohen, supra note 145, at 1778.  See also Mobbs et al., supra note 145, at 0693 
(noting that the legal system can be improved by “deepening understandings about why people 
behave as they do”). 
 151. Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization: Expert Psychological 
Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 277, 287 (1992). 
 152. DAVID BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW 63 (1987).  
See also Virgin Islands v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927, 937 (3d Cir. 1978) (Adams, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he law of criminal responsibility [is] a screen upon which the community . . . project[s] its 
visions of criminal justice.”). 
 153. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological 
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 104 (1993).  See also Tosha Foster, Note, From Fear to 
Rage: Black Rage as a Natural Progression From and Functional Equivalent of Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1851, 1880 n.189 (1997) (citing RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. 
AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-
HINCKLEY ERA 129 (1988) (finding in a study that juries faced with an insanity defense put experts’ 
clinical/medical testimony into a moral-legal context)). 
 154. Amanda Pustilnik, Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and Economic Inefficiency in the 
Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 217, 263 (2005) 
(emphasis added).  See also Perlin, Sanist Lives of Jurors, supra note 100, at 257 (“[J]urors reflect 
and project the conventional morality of the community . . . .”). 
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again to the question of sanism to determine whether an understanding 
of this phenomenon can offer us some answers. 
VI.  SANISM 
First, what do I mean by “sanism”?  Sanism is an irrational 
prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices 
that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, 
sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.155  It permeates all aspects of 
mental disability law and affects all participants in the mental disability 
law system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, expert and lay witnesses.  “Its 
corrosive effects have warped mental disability law jurisprudence in 
involuntary civil commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all 
aspects of the criminal process (pretrial, trial, and sentencing).”156 
Here I pose this question: how will juror sanism play out in cases 
involving neuroscience evidence?  I have been thinking and writing 
about sanism for thirty years,157 and, for the first time, I am not entirely 
sure. 
One would think that the “hard science” aspects on neuroimaging 
would alleviate or palliate some of the sanist attitudes that permeate 
insanity defense jurisprudence.158  It is vivid, it is clear, and it appears to 
have survived testing and falsification efforts.159  As such, it would seem 
to take away much of the sanist antipathy toward, and distrust of, the 
insanity defense.  This analysis totally sidesteps the empirical question 
of whether neuroimaging really is as objective and as immune to 
 
 155. See generally Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1992). 
 156. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 684 (2003). 
 157. See Michael L. Perlin, The Deinstitutionalization Myths: Old Wine in New Bottles, in 
CONFERENCE REPORT: THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE 
MENTALLY DISABLED 20 (Karl Menninger & Heather Watts eds., 1979).  For subsequent 
reconsiderations, see, e.g., Perlin, supra note 155; PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8; Michael 
L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How 
Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3 (1999). 
 158. See Paul Skolnick & Jerry Shaw, A Comparison of Eyewitness and Physical Evidence on 
Mock-Juror Decisionmaking, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 614, 623 (2001) (finding that physical 
evidence had a greater impact on jurors than did eyewitness testimony). 
 159. See Kulynych, supra note 41, at 236.  “[U]nlike inkblots, neuroimages are graphic 
representations of real data about the physical brain, and as such they have enormous underlying 
scientific complexity.”  Id.  See also, e.g., Jessica Gurley & David Marcus, The Effects of 
Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 94 (2008) (“The 
neuroimages of readily apparent brain damage give the jurors tangible proof of the disorder.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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falsification efforts as its proponents believe.  The point here, as always, 
is one of perception. 
But, as I suggested earlier, I am not sure.  Much of the valid and 
reliable behavioral literature that has been done on the insanity defense 
tells us that jurors just don’t care.160  That, in spite of a staggering array 
of unanimous evidence to the contrary, they continue to adhere to 
empirical myths about the defense’s use, its success rate, its (lack of) 
risk to the pleader, its dispositional phase, and, especially, its inherent 
falseness.161 
And research shows that jurors who hold unfavorable attitudes 
toward the insanity defense – as a defense – simply do not accept a 
defendant’s mental status as a justification for exculpation.162  
Interestingly, and tantalizingly, other research literature tells us that 
jurors rely mostly on a “story model,” through which they “arrive at 
verdicts by constructing a story about what happened during an alleged 
crime based on the evidence and their episode schemata or world 
knowledge about similar events.”163  It is not clear at all how 
neuroimaging evidence “fits” (or does not “fit”) within this model. 
So, I am not at all sure that the pizzazz of neuroimaging testimony 
– notwithstanding its colorfulness and its propensity to reductionism – 
will trump these deep-seated attitudes (the roots of which go back 
hundreds, maybe thousands, of years, and involve concepts of evil, sin, 
religion, and the supernatural world).164  Some twenty years ago, writing 
 
 160. See Cirincione & Jacobs, supra note 112; Richard W. Jeffrey & Richard A. Pasewark, 
Altering Opinions About the Insanity Plea, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 29 (1984); Louden & Skeem, 
supra note 148. 
 161. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 8, at 1416. 
[T]he fear of feigned insanity and the distrust of expert witnesses’ ability to identify 
malingering behavior continue to dominate insanity defense jurisprudence.  The 
empirical data suggesting that this problem is minimal continues to be trivialized, and 
judges, legislators and jurors continue to adhere to this most powerful of all myths. 
Id.  See generally PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8. 
 162. Ronald Poulson et al., Relations Among Mock Jurors’ Attitudes, Trial Evidence, and Their 
Selections of an Insanity Defense Verdict: A Path Analytic Approach, 82 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 3, 
11 (1998). 
 163. Jennifer Skeem & Stephen Golding, Describing Jurors’ Personal Conceptions of Insanity 
and Their Relationship to Case Judgments, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 561, 612 (2001). 
 164. See, e.g., Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 8, at 10 n.54 (discussing JUDITH S. NEAMAN, 
SUGGESTION OF THE DEVIL: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS 31, 144 (1975) (addressing the stereotype of 
persons with mental illness as evil)); Michael L. Perlin, “There Was an Evil Messenger”: Blame, 
Mental Illness, Wickedness, the Insanity Defense and the Pretexts of the Justice System (paper 
presented at the 30th International Congress on Law and Mental Health, Padua, Italy, June 2007) 
(addressing the same point); Perlin, Myths, supra note 8, at 626 (“[H]istor[ically], mental illness 
was tied to notions of religion and traditionally seen as God’s punishment for sin . . . .”).  See Skeem 
& Golding, supra note 163, at 563 (stating that jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity defense were 
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about the insanity defense in Ohio, John McHenry concluded that that 
state’s defense will probably remain static until the time that “all human 
behavior, emotions, and thoughts will be discernible from examining a 
string of DNA on the end of a pin.”165  I am not convinced that he was 
wrong.166 
Again, I say this tentatively.  It is likely that neuroimaging 
testimony will be admitted in more criminal cases (including, at least in 
some instances, cases that do not include famous defendants, famous 
victims, or famous crimes).  After there is a more robust database, we 
will perhaps know more than we do now.  But, at the moment I am not 
prepared to say that neuroimaging testimony will eviscerate all our sanist 
biases. 
There is one more nook and cranny for me to explore here, 
however.  I have frequently expressed my belief that we can make no 
lasting progress in any related inquiry until we confront the sanist biases 
of the mental disability law system “and the ways that these biases blunt 
our ability to intelligently weigh and assess social science data in the 
creation of a mental disability law jurisprudence.”167  I believe we can 
only do this using the tool of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
VII.  THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) presents a new model by which we 
can assess the ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects 
mentally disabled individuals; namely, by studying the role of the law as 
a therapeutic agent; recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures, 
and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
consequences; and questioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles 
can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, 
while not subordinating due process principles.168  In recent years, TJ 
 
more strongly associated with their verdicts than were manipulations of case facts and available 
verdict categories) (citing Roberts & Golding, supra note 90). 
 165. John McHenry, The Judicial Evolution of Ohio’s Insanity Defense, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
49, 78 (1987). 
 166. Another “wild card” here is the seriousness of the charge.  Marnie Rice and Grant Harris’s 
research has revealed that “index offense seriousness” was one of the two most important insanity 
defense verdict determinants, notwithstanding the fact that this is irrelevant to any substantive 
definition of the defense.  Marnie Rice & Grant Harris, The Predictors of Insanity Acquittal, 13 
INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 217, 222 (1990).  See Louden & Skeem, supra note 148, at 462 (stating 
that jurors’ pre-existing attitudes may actually prevent them from following a trial judge’s charge). 
 167. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 266. 
 168. Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 8, at 30-31 n.233.  See generally THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990); ESSAYS IN 
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scholars have turned increasingly more attention to the application of TJ 
in a criminal law context.169  There has been, however, almost no 
therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship as of yet on the question that I am 
addressing here: what are the TJ implications of greater reliance on 
neuroimaging testimony in cases in which the defendant raises a non-
responsibility defense?170 
In the conclusion of my book-length treatment of the insanity 
defense, I offered eight recommendations to policymakers as means 
through which we could seek to ameliorate the “jurisprudential 
incoherence” of that defense.171  The seventh of the eight 
recommendations was this: 
[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to 
each aspect of the insanity defense.  We need to take what we learn 
from therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual 
reasoning and teleological decision making from the insanity defense 
process.  This would enable us to confront the pretextual use of social 
science data in an open and meaningful way.172 
In that recommendation, I was focusing on the substance of the 
defense and the procedures that governed insanity defense trials and the 
insanity acquittee retention process.  In an in-press article, I consider the 
 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); LAW IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler 
& Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW (Bruce J. Winick ed., 1997). 
 169. See DAVID B. WEXLER, REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (2008); David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework 
for Incorporating Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Criminal Law, Research, and Practice, 7 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 95 (2005); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative 
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer,17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743 (2005); David B. Wexler, Some 
Reflections on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Practice of Criminal Law, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 
(2002).  None of these articles, nor the most important, recent critique of Prof. Wexler’s approach to 
these questions – see Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler’s Warm Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable To Join You, Already (Somewhat 
Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539 (2007), responded to in David B. Wexler, Not Such a 
Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597 (2007) – touches on 
these issues. 
On the use of TJ in a correctional context, see Astrid Birgden, A Compulsory Drug Treatment 
Program for Offenders in Australia: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 367 (2008); Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, “Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned 
and Forsaked”: Community Safety, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights 
Law as Applied to Prisoners and Detainees, 13 LEG. & CRIMINOL. PSYCHOL. 231 (2008). 
 170. But see infra note 176. 
 171. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 440. 
 172. Id. at 443. 
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implications of TJ “to the way that lawyers represent persons in the 
insanity incompetency process . . . (and the ways they represent them 
before the decision is made to enter into an insanity plea . . .).”173  But, 
certainly neuroimaging presents additional and important issues beyond 
the ones I discuss elsewhere. 
There has been almost no TJ literature yet published that has even 
touched on the scientific issues that I discuss in this paper.  A.J. Stephani 
has briefly discussed recent developments in neuroscience as a rationale 
for the possible expansion of injury-based statutory criterion for child 
neglect,174 and Janet Weinstein and Ricardo Weinstein have cited to the 
neuroscience literature in explaining how “anger builds on anger” in the 
context of serious family law disputes.175  Professor Warren Brookbanks 
(of the University of Auckland Law School in New Zealand) is currently 
working on papers that begin this study,176 but as of yet, none have been 
published.  This appears to me to be a fertile area for future researchers 
to explore. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The question that I pose here is far from an easy one to answer.  
Perhaps Richard Redding is correct when he says that this evidence will 
make it easier for jurors to parse insanity claims.177  Perhaps Neil 
Feigenson is correct when he says that this evidence “reduces 
psychosocial complexity” via “naive realism,” making it 
“inappropriately persuasive.”178  Perhaps Joshua Greene and Jonathan 
Cohen are correct in their discussion of the likely impact of 
neuroimaging on the ways jurors construct free will and retribution, 
arguing that advances in this discipline “are likely to change the way that 
people think about human action and criminal responsibility.”179 
 
 173. Perlin, supra note 13, manuscript at 17. 
 174. A.J. Stephani, Symposium: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Children, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
13, 14 (2002). 
 175. Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein, “I Know Better Than That”: The Role of Emotions 
and the Brain in Family Law Disputes, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 351, 383 n.127 (2005). 
 176. See Warren Brookbanks, Neuroscience, Folk Psychology, and the Future of Criminal 
Responsibility (on file with the author); Warren Brookbanks, Developments in Neuroscience and the 
Law: Is Mens Rea Behind Us? (on file with the author); Warren Brookbanks, Neuroscience and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Collision or Synthesis 362, available at 
http://ialmh.org/NewYork2009/Book_Version_4.pdf (last visited, Sept. 10, 2008) (abstract of 
presentation to be given at the International Academy of Law and Mental Health, June-July 2009). 
 177. Redding, supra note 5, at 101. 
 178. Feigenson, supra note 42, at 247, 248. 
 179. Greene & Cohen, supra note 145, at 1784. 
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Neuroimaging is (or isn’t) hard science.  It is (or isn’t) relatively 
easy for jurors to interpret.  It is (or isn’t) immune to falsification efforts.  
It is (or isn’t) objective.  It will (or won’t) lead jurors to “better” verdicts 
in insanity cases.  It will (or won’t) be used disproportionately in news-
friendly cases.  It will (or won’t) “trump” jurors’ inherent suspicion of 
the insanity defense.  It does (and here there is no contradictory or 
antipodal position) raise a variety of important and provocative legal, 
behavioral, and social issues, none of which has received nearly enough 
attention by the courts or by commentators. 
So what are we to make of this?  I believe that the key to an answer 
here is a consideration of sanism: to what extent will our prejudices, our 
stereotypes, our slotting, and our typification180 overwhelm all other 
evidence and all other issues in this conversation?181  In every aspect of 
mental disability law that I have ever studied,182 the answer has been “to 
a great extent.”  Is there any reason to think it will be less so here?  
Perhaps the seductive dazzle of colorful pictures will trump millennia of 
fear and superstition.  But, as of today I wouldn’t bet on it (and this 
analysis again completely and consciously sidesteps the question of 
whether this evidence is as valuable in litigation as its proponents argue). 
I do not want to sound entirely pessimistic.  I continue to believe 
that it is therapeutic jurisprudence – and only therapeutic jurisprudence – 
that has the potential power to “strip . . . the sanist facade”183 from this 
subject matter, and, in this exposure, allow us to confront the actual 
substantive issues – legal, biomedical, and ethical – that are before us.  
As I noted, this inquiry has not yet been undertaken; I hope my paper 
spurs my colleagues to do so. 
I chose Bob Dylan’s song “License to Kill” for my title because it 
was a meditation on “technology run amok.”184  When Dylan was 
interviewed by Rolling Stone the year after the song was recorded, he 
was asked whether he believed another lyric in the song: “Man has 
invented his doom/First step was touching the moon” actually reflected 
reality.185  He responded, “Yeah, I do . . . on some level, it’s just like a 
 
 180. See Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 125 n.112 (1991); Perlin, Sanism, supra note 155, at 685. 
 181. In keeping with the musical reference in the title, I will call this the C major chord of all 
mental disability law. 
 182. See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 13. 
 183. Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institutional Mental 
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 544 (2003). 
 184. TRAGER, supra note 15, at 376. 
 185. Kurt Loder, The Rolling Stone Interview: Bob Dylan, ROLLING STONE, June 21, 1984, 
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5938701/bob_dylan_the_rolling_stone_ 
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door into the unknown.”186  To a great extent, that could be the tag line 
for this entire area of exploration and investigation. 
 
 
 
interview/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (as quoted in CHRISTOPHER RICKS, DYLAN’S VISIONS OF SIN 
48 n.2 (2003)). 
 186. Id. 
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